Abstract. When dealing with process calculi and automata which express both nondeterministic and probabilistic behavior, it is customary to introduce the notion of scheduler to solve the nondeterminism. It has been observed that for certain applications, notably those in security, the scheduler needs to be restricted so not to reveal the outcome of the protocol's random choices, or otherwise the model of adversary would be too strong even for "obviously correct" protocols. We propose a process-algebraic framework in which the control on the scheduler can be specified in syntactic terms, and we show how to apply it to solve the problem mentioned above. We also consider the definition of (probabilistic) may and must preorders, and we show that they are precongruences with respect to the restricted schedulers. Furthermore, we show that all the operators of the language, except replication, distribute over probabilistic summation, which is a useful property for verification.
Introduction
Security protocols, in particular those for for anonymity and fair exchange, often use randomization to achieve their targets. Since they usually involve more than one agent, they also give rise to concurrent and interactive activities that can be best modeled by nondeterminism. Thus it is convenient to specify them using a formalism which is able to represent both probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior. Formalisms of this kind have been explored in both Automata Theory [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and in Process Algebra [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] . See also [12, 13] for comparative and more inclusive overviews.
Due to the presence of nondeterminism, in such formalisms it is not possible to define the probability of events in absolute terms. We need first to decide how each nondeterministic choice during the execution will be solved. This decision function is called scheduler. Once the scheduler is fixed, the behavior of the system (relatively to the given scheduler) becomes fully probabilistic and a probability measure can be defined following standard techniques.
It has been observed by several researchers that in security the notion of scheduler needs to be restricted, or otherwise any secret choice of the protocol could be revealed by making the choice of the scheduler depend on it. This issue was for instance one of the main topics of discussion at the panel of CSFW 2006. We illustrate it here with an example on anonymity. We use the standard CCS notation, plus a construct of probabilistic choice P + p Q representing a process that evolves into P with probability p and into Q with probability 1 − p.
The following system Sys consists of one receiver R and two senders S, T which communicate via private channels a, b respectively. Which of the two senders is successful is decided probabilistically by R. After reception, R sends a signal ok. The signal ok is not private, but since it is the same in both cases, in principle an external observer should not be able to infer from it the identity of the sender (S or T ). So the system should be anonymous. However, consider a team of two attackers A and B defined as and consider the parallel composition Sys | A | B . We have that, under certain schedulers, the system is no longer anonymous. More precisely, a scheduler could leak the identity of the sender via the channels s, t by forcing R to synchronize with A on ok if R has chosen the first alternative, and with B otherwise. This is because in general a scheduler can see the whole history of the computation, in particular the random choices, even those which are supposed to be private. Note that the visibility of the synchronization channels to the scheduler is not crucial for this example: we would have the same problem, for instance, if S, T were both defined asā.0, R as a.ok .0, and Sys as (νa)((R + 0.5 S) | T ). The above example demonstrates that, with the standard definition of scheduler, it is not possible to represent a truly private random choice (or a truly private nondeterministic choice, for the matter) with the current probabilistic process calculi. This is a clear shortcoming when we want to use these formalisms for the specification and verification of security protocols.
There is another issue related to verification: a private choice has certain algebraic properties that would be useful in proving equivalences between processes. In fact, if the outcome of a choice remains private, then it should not matter at which point of the execution the process makes such choice, until it actually uses it. Consider for instance A and B defined as follows Process A receives a value and then decides randomly whether it will accept the value 0 or 1. Process B does exactly the same thing except that the choice is performed before the reception of the value. If the random choices in A and B are private, intuitively we should have that A and B are equivalent (A ≈ B). This is because it should not matter whether the choice is done before or after receiving A |ā0 |ā1
0 ok Fig. 1 . Execution trees for A | C and B | C a message, as long as the outcome of the choice is completely invisible to any other process or observer. However, consider the parallel context C = a0 | a1.
Under any scheduler A has probability at most 1/2 to perform ok . With B, on the other hand, the scheduler can choose between a0 and a1 based on the outcome of the probabilistic choice, thus making the maximum probability of ok equal to 1. The execution trees of A | C and B | C are shown in Figure 1 .
In general when + p represents a private choice we would like to have
for all processes P, Q and all contexts C not containing replication (or recursion).
In the case of replication the above cannot hold since !(P + p Q) makes available each time the choice between P and Q, while (!τ.P ) + p (!τ.Q) chooses once and for all which of the two (P or Q) should be replicated. Similarly for recursion. The reason why we need a τ is explained in Section 5. The algebraic property (1) expresses in an abstract way the privacy of the probabilistic choice. Moreover, this property is also useful for the verification of security properties. The interested reader can find in [14] an example of application to a fair exchange protocol. In principle (1) should be useful for any kind of verification in the process algebra style.
We propose a process-algebraic approach to the problem of hiding the outcome of random choices. Our framework is based on a calculus obtained by adding to CCS an internal probabilistic choice construct 1 . This calculus, to which we refer as CCS p , is a variant of the one studied in [11] , the main differences being that we use replication instead than recursion, and we lift some restrictions that were imposed in [11] to obtain a complete axiomatization. The semantics of CCS p is given in terms of Segala's simple probabilistic automata [4, 7] .
In order to limit the power of the scheduler, we extend CCS p with terms representing explicitly the notion of scheduler. The latter interact with the original processes via a labeling system. This will allow to specify at the syntactic level (by a suitable labeling) which choices should be visible to schedulers, and which ones should not.
Contribution
The main contributions of this paper are:
-A process calculus CCS σ in which the scheduler is represented as a process, and whose power can therefore be controlled at the syntactic level. -An application of CCS σ to an extended anonymity example (the Dining Cryptographers Protocol, DCP). We also briefly outline how to extend CCS σ so to allow the definition of private nondeterministic choice, and we apply it to the DCP with nondeterministic master. To our knowledge this is the first formal treatment of the scheduling problem in DCP and the first formalization of a nondeterministic master for the (probabilistic) DCP. -The adaptation of the standard notions of probabilistic testing preorders to CCS σ , and the "sanity check" that they are still precongruences with respect to all the operators except the nondeterministic sum. For the latter we have the problem that P and τ.P are must equivalent, but Q + P and Q + τ.P are not. This is typical for the CCS +: usually it does not preserve weak equivalences. -The proof that, under suitable conditions on the labelings of C, τ.P and τ.Q, CCS σ satisfies the property expressed by (1), where ≈ is probabilistic testing equivalence.
Related work
The works that are most closely related to ours are [17, 18] . In those paper the authors consider probabilistic automata and introduce a restriction on the scheduler to the purpose of making them suitable to applications in security protocols. Their approach is based on dividing the actions of each component of the system in equivalence classes (tasks). The order of execution of different tasks is decided in advance by a so-called task scheduler. The remaining nondeterminism within a task is solved by a second scheduler, which models the standard adversarial scheduler of the cryptographic community. This second entity has limited knowledge about the other components: it sees only the information that they communicate during execution. In contrast to the above approach, our definition of scheduler is based on a labeling system, and the same action can receive different labels during the execution, so our "equivalence classes" (schedulable actions with the same label) can change dynamically. However we don't know at the moment whether this difference determines a separation in the expressive power. The main difference, anyway, is that our framework is process-algebraic and we focus on testing preorders, their congruence properties, and the conditions under which certain equivalences hold.
Another work along these lines is [15] , which uses partitions on the state-space to obtain partial-information schedulers. However in that paper the authors consider a synchronous parallel composition, so the setting is rather different.
Plan of the paper
In the next section we briefly recall some basic notions. In Section 3 we define a preliminary version of the language CCS σ and of the corresponding notion of scheduler. In Section 4 we compare our notion of scheduler with the more standard "semantic" notion, and we improve the definition of CCS σ so to retrieve the full expressive power of the semantic schedulers. In Section 5 we study the probabilistic testing preorders, their compositionality properties, and the conditions under which (1) holds. Section 6 presents an application to security. Section 7 concludes.
Preliminaries
In this section we briefly recall some preliminary notions about the simple probabilistic automata and CCS p .
Simple probabilistic automata [4,7]
A discrete probability measure over a set X is a function µ : 2
where X i is a countable family of pairwise disjoint subsets of X. The set of all discrete probability measures over X will be denoted by Disc(X). We will denote by δ(x), x ∈ X (called the Dirac measure on x) the probability measure that assigns probability 1 to {x}. We will also denote by i [p i ]µ i the probability measure obtained as a convex sum of the measures µ i .
A simple probabilistic automaton 2 is a tuple (S, q, A, D) where S is a set of states, q ∈ S is the initial state, A is a set of actions and D ⊆ S ×A×Disc(S) is a transition relation. Intuitively, if (s, a, µ) ∈ D then there is a transition from the state s performing the action a and leading to a distribution µ over the states of the automaton. The idea is that the choice of transition among the available ones in D is performed nondeterministically, and the choice of the target state among the ones allowed by µ (i.e. those states q such that µ(q) > 0) is performed probabilistically.
A probabilistic automaton M is fully probabilistic if from each state of M there is at most one transition available. An execution α of a probabilistic automaton is a (possibly infinite) sequence s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 . . . of alternating states and actions, such that q = s 0 , and for each i (s i , a i+1 , µ i ) ∈ D and µ i (s i+1 ) > 0 hold. We will use lstate(α) to denote the last state of a finite execution α, and exec * (M ) and exec(M ) to represent the set of all the finite and of all the executions of M , respectively.
A scheduler of a probabilistic automaton M = (S, q, A, D) is a function such that ζ(α) = (s, a, µ) ∈ D implies that s = lstate(α). The idea is that a scheduler selects a transition among the ones available in D and it can base his decision on the history of the execution. The execution tree of M relative to the scheduler ζ, denoted by etree(M, ζ), is a fully probabilistic automaton
if and only if ζ(α) = (lstate(α), a, µ) for some µ and µ ′ (αas) = µ(s). Intuitively, etree(M, ζ) is produced by unfolding the executions of M and resolving all deterministic choices using ζ. Note that etree(M, ζ) is a simple 3 and fully probabilistic automaton.
CCS with internal probabilistic choice
Let a range over a countable set of channel names. The syntax of CCS p is the following:
α ::= a |ā | τ prefixes P, Q ::= processes α.P prefix
We will also use the notation P 1 + p P 2 to represent a binary sum i p i P i with p 1 = p and p 2 = 1 − p.
The semantics of a CCS p term is a probabilistic automaton defined inductively on the basis of the syntax according to the rules in Figure 2 . We write s a −→ µ when (s, a, µ) is a transition of the probabilistic automaton. We also denote by µ | Q the measure µ ′ such that µ ′ (P | Q) = µ(P ) for all processes P and µ
A transition of the form P a −→ δ(P ′ ), i.e. a transition having for target a Dirac measure, corresponds to a transition of a non-probabilistic automaton (a standard labeled transition system). Thus, all the rules of CCS p imitate the ones of CCS except from PROB. The latter models the internal probabilistic choice: a silent τ transition is available from the sum to a measure containing all of its operands, with the corresponding probabilities.
Note that in the produced probabilistic automaton, all transitions to nonDirac measures are silent. This is similar to the alternating model [2] , however our case is more general because the silent and non-silent transitions are not necessarily alternated. On the other hand, with respect to to the simple probabilistic automata the fact that the probabilistic transitions are silent looks as a restriction. However, it has been proved by Bandini and Segala [7] that the simple probabilistic automata and the alternating model are essentially equivalent, so, being in the middle, our model is equivalent as well.
A variant of CCS with explicit scheduler
In this section we present a variant of CCS in which the scheduler is explicit, in the sense that it has a specific syntax and its behavior is defined by the operational semantics of the calculus. We will refer to this calculus as CCS σ . Processes in CCS σ contain labels that allow us to refer to a particular sub-process. A scheduler also behaves like a process, using however a different and much simpler syntax, and its purpose is to guide the execution of the main process using the labels that the latter provides. A complete process is a process running in parallel with a scheduler, and we will formally describe their interaction by defining an operational semantics for complete processes.
We will present CCS σ in an incremental way. First we define the basic calculus CCS σ which is the same as CCS p with the addition of the explicit scheduler. Then we will perform an extensions of this basic calculus by adding choice to the scheduler so to achieve its full expressive power. Finally, in Section 6, we outline an extension of CCS σ with a second independent scheduler, to the purpose of making private certain nondeterministic choices.
Syntax
Let a range over a countable set of channel names and l over a countable set of atomic labels. The syntax of CCS σ , shown in Figure 3 , is the same as the one of CCS p except for the presence of labels. These are used to select the subprocess which "performs" a transition. Since only the operators with an initial rule can
CP ::= P S complete process Fig. 3 . The syntax of the core CCS σ originate a transition, we only need to assign labels to the prefix and to the probabilistic sum. We use labels of the form l s where l is an atomic label and the index s is a finite string of 0 and 1, possibly empty 4 . Indexes are used to avoid multiple copies of the same label in case of replication, which occurs dynamically due to the the bang operator. As explained in the semantics, each time a process is replicated we relabel it using appropriate indexes.
A scheduler selects a sub-process for execution on the basis of its label, so we use σ(l).S to represent a scheduler that selects the process with label l and continues as S. In the case of synchronization we need to select two processes simultaneously, hence we need a scheduler the form σ(l 1 , l 2 ).S. A complete process is a process put in parallel with a scheduler, for example l 1 :a.l 2 :b σ(l 1 ).σ(l 2 ). Note that for processes with an infinite execution path we need schedulers of infinite length.
Semantics
The operational semantics of the CCS σ -calculus is given in terms of probabilistic automata defined inductively on the basis of the syntax, according to the rules shown in Figure 4 .
ACT is the basic communication rule. In order for l : α.P to perform α, the scheduler should select this process for execution, so the scheduler needs to be of the form σ(l).S. After the execution the complete process will continue as P S. The RES rule models restriction on channel a: communication on this channel is not allowed by the restricted process. Similarly to the section 2.2, we denote by (νa)µ the measure µ ′ such that µ ′ ((νa)P S) = µ(P S) for all processes P and µ ′ (R S) = 0 if R is not of the form (νa)P . SUM1 models nondeterministic choice. If P S can perform a transition to µ, which means that S selects one of the labels of P , then P + Q S will perform the same transition, i.e. the branch P of the choice will be selected and Q will be discarded. For example
Note that the operands of the sum do not have labels, the labels belong to the subprocesses of P and Q. In the case of nested choices, the scheduler must go deep and select the label of a prefix, thus resolving all the choices at once.
PAR1 has a similar behavior for parallel composition. The scheduler selects P to perform a transition on the basis of the label. The difference is that in this case Q is not discarded; it remains in the continuation. µ | Q denotes the measure µ ′ such that µ ′ (P | Q S) = µ(P S). COM models synchronization. If P σ(l 1 ) can perform the action a and Q σ(l 2 ) can performā, then σ(l 1 , l 2 ), scheduling both l 1 and l 2 at the same time, can synchronize the two. PROB models internal probabilistic choice. Note that the scheduler cannot affect the outcome of the choice, it can only schedule the choice as a whole (that's why a probabilistic sum has a label) and the process will move to a measure containing all the operands with corresponding probabilities.
Finally, BANG1 and BANG2 model replication. The rules are the same as in CCS p , with the addition of a re-labeling operator ρ k . The reason for this is that we want to avoid ending up with multiple copies of the same label as the result of replication, since this would create ambiguities in scheduling as explained in section 3.3. ρ k (P ) replaces all labels l s inside P with l sk , and it is defined as
and homomorphically on the other operators (for instance ρ k (P | Q) = ρ k (P ) | ρ k (Q)). We also denote by ρ k (µ) the measure µ ′ such that µ ′ (ρ k (P ) S) = µ(P S). Note that we relabel only the resulting process, not the continuation of the scheduler: there is no need for relabeling the scheduler since we are free to choose the continuation as we please. Let us give an example of how BANG1 and relabeling work. Let P = l 1 :a.l 2 :b. To prove a transition for !P σ(l 1 ).S we have to prove it for P and then relabel the resulting process:
As we can see in the example, when a process ! P is activated, the spawned copy of P is relabeled by adding 0 to the index of all the labels, and !P is relabeled by adding 1. So the labels of ρ 0 (P ) and ρ 1 (!P ) will be disjoint. As remarked above, the continuation S is not relabeled, if we want to perform b after a then S should start with σ(l 0 2 ).
Deterministic labelings
The idea in CCS σ is that a syntactic scheduler will be able to completely solve the nondeterminism of the process, without needing to rely on a semantic scheduler at the level of the automaton. This means that the execution of a process in parallel with a scheduler should be fully probabilistic. To achieve this we will impose a condition on the labels that we can use in CCS σ processes. A labeling is an assignment of labels to the prefixes and probabilistic sums of a process. We will require all labelings to be deterministic in the following sense.
Definition 1.
A labeling of a process P is deterministic iff for all schedulers S there is only one transition rule P S α −→ µ that can be applied and the labelings of all processes P ′ such that µ(P ′ ) > 0 are also deterministic.
A labeling is linear iff all labels are pairwise disjoint. We can show that linear labelings are preserved by transitions, which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A linear labeling is deterministic.
There are labelings that are deterministic without being linear. In fact, such labelings will be the means by which we hide information from the scheduler. However, the property of being deterministic is crucial since it implies that the scheduler will resolve all the nondeterminism of the process.
Proposition 2. Let P be a CCS σ process with a deterministic labeling. Then for all schedulers S, the automaton produced by P S is fully probabilistic.
Expressiveness of the syntactic scheduler
CCS σ with deterministic labelings allows us to separate probabilities from nondeterminism in a straightforward way: a process in parallel with a scheduler behaves in a fully probabilistic way and the nondeterminism arises from the fact that we can have many different schedulers. We may now ask the question: how powerful are the syntactic schedulers wrt the semantic ones, i.e. those defined directly over the automaton?
Let P be as CCS p process and P σ be the CCS σ process obtained from P by applying a linear labeling. We say that the semantic scheduler ζ of P is equivalent to the syntactic scheduler S of P σ , written ζ ∼ P S, iff the automata 5 etree(P, ζ) and P σ S are probabilistically bisimilar in the sense of [5] .
A scheduler S is non-blocking for a process P if it always schedules some transitions, except when P itself is blocked. Since semantic schedulers are usually not allowed to block, we will restraint ourselves to non-blocking syntactic schedulers to obtain a 1 − 1 correspondence. Let Sem(P ) be the set of the semantic schedulers for the process P , and Syn(P σ ) be the set of the non-blocking syntactic schedulers for process P σ . The following result holds for pure CCS processes (that is, CCS p processes without probabilistic choice).
Proposition 3. Let P be a pure CCS process and let P σ be a CCS σ process obtained by adding a linear labeling to P . Then ∀ζ ∈ Sem(P ) ∃S ∈ Syn(P σ ) : ζ ∼ P S and ∀S ∈ Syn(P σ ) ∃ζ ∈ Sem(P ) : ζ ∼ P S
The scheduler in the presence of probabilistic choice
In Proposition 3 we considered pure CCS processes in which the execution tree has only one possible execution. Now consider a process P containing an internal probabilistic choice. Even if we fix the scheduler, the outcome of the choice is not always the same, so P S could produce different executions. As a consequence, the syntactic schedulers we have defined are not enough to give us back all the semantic ones. Consider the process P = l:(l 1 :a + p l 2 :b). After the probabilistic choice, either l 1 : a or l 2 : b will be available, but we cannot know which one. As a consequence, we cannot create a scheduler that selects a or b, whatever is available. In fact, it's not even possible to create a non-blocking scheduler at all, both σ(l).σ(l 1 ) and σ(l).σ(l 2 ) will block on some executions.
The problem here is that the process can make choices that are independent from the scheduler, so the latter should adapt its behavior to the outcome of these choices. To achieve this, we extend CCS σ by adding a scheduler choice construct. The new syntax and semantics are displayed in Figure 5 . A scheduler can be the sum i S i of several schedulers, and the outcome of the probabilistic choice (in the process) will determine the one to activate. In the case where more than one could be activated at the same time, we give preference to the first one in the sum, so the scheduler still behaves in a deterministic way. In our previous example, we can use the scheduler σ(l)(σ(l 1 ) + σ(l 2 )) which will produce a or b depending on the outcome of the probabilistic choice. With the scheduler choice, we can retrieve the full power of the semantic scheduler for full CCS p processes.
Proposition 4. Proposition 3 holds for full CCS p processes if we extend schedulers with scheduler choice.

Using non-linear labelings
Up to now we are using only linear labelings which, as we saw, give us the whole power of semantic schedulers. However, we can construct non-linear labelings that are still deterministic, that is there is still only one transition possible at any time even though we have multiple occurrences of the same label. There are various cases of useful non-linear labelings.
Proposition 5. Let P ,Q be CCS σ processes with deterministic labelings (not necessarily disjoint). The following labelings are all deterministic:
Consider the case where P and Q in the above proposition share the same labels. In (2) the scheduler cannot select an action inside P, Q, it must select the choice itself. After the choice, only one of P, Q will be available so there will be no ambiguity in selecting transitions. The case (3) is similar but with nondeterministic choice. Now the guarding prefixes must have different labels, since the scheduler should be able to resolve the choice, however after the choice only one of P, Q will be available. Hence, again, the multiple copies of the labels do not constitute a problem. In (4) we allow the same label on the guarding prefixes of a nondeterministic choice. This is because the guarding channels a, b are restricted and only one of the corresponding output actions is available (ā). As a consequence, there is no ambiguity in selecting transitions. A scheduler σ(l 1 , l 2 ) can only perform a synchronization on a, even though l 1 appears twice. However, using multiple copies of a label limits the power of the scheduler, since the labels provide information about the outcome of a probabilistic choice (and allow the scheduler to choose different strategies through the use of the scheduler choice). In fact, this is exactly the technique we will use to archive the goals described in Section 1. Consider for example the process:
From Proposition 5(2) this labeling is deterministic. However, since both branches of the probabilistic sum have the same label l 1 , the scheduler cannot resolve the choice between P and Q based on the outcome of the choice. There is still nondeterminism: the scheduler σ(l).σ(l 1 , l 2 ) will select P and the scheduler σ(l).σ(l 1 , l 3 ) will select Q. However this selection will be independent from the outcome of the probabilistic choice.
Note that we did not impose any direct restrictions on the schedulers, we still consider all possible syntactic schedulers for the process (5) above. However, having the same label twice limits the power of the syntactic schedulers with respect to the semantic ones. This approach has the advantage that the restrictions are limited to the choices with the same label. We already know that having pairwise different labels gives the full power of the semantic scheduler. So the restriction is local to the place where we, intentionally, put the same labels.
Testing relations for CCS σ processes
Testing relations [19] are a method of comparing processes by considering their interaction with the environment. A test is a process running in parallel with the one being tested and which can perform a distinguished action ω that represents success. Two processes are testing equivalent if they can pass the same tests. This idea is very useful for the analysis of security protocols, as suggested in [20] , since a test can be seen as an adversary who interferes with a communication agent and declares ω if an attack is successful. Then two processes are testing equivalent if they are vulnerable to the same attacks.
In the probabilistic setting we take the approach of [13] which considers the exact probability of passing a test (in contrast to [10] which considers only the ability to pass a test with probability non-zero (may-testing) or one (musttesting)). This approach leads to the definition of two preorders ⊑ may and ⊑ must . P ⊑ may Q means that the if P can pass O then Q can also pass O with the same probability. P ⊑ must Q means that if P always passes O with at least some probability then Q always passes O with at least the same probability.
A labeling of a process is fresh (with respect to a set P of processes) if it is linear and its labels do not appear in any other process in P. A test O is a CCS σ process with a fresh labeling, containing the distinguished action ω. Let Test P denote the set of all tests with respect to P and let (ν)P denote the restriction on all channels of P , thus allowing only τ actions. We define p ω (P, S, O) to be the probability of the set of executions of the fully probabilistic automaton (ν)(P | O) S that contain ω. Note that this set can be produced as a countable union of disjoint cones so its probability is well-defined. Definition 2. Let P, Q be CCS σ processes. We define must and may testing preorders as follows:
We also define ≈ may , ≈ must to be the equivalences induced by ⊑ may , ⊑ must respectively. A context C is a process with a hole. A preorder ⊑ is a precongruence if
for all contexts C. May and must testing are precongruences if we restrict to contexts with fresh labelings and without occurrences of +. This result is essentially an adaptation to our framework of the analogous precongruence property in [3] .
Proposition 6. Let P, Q be CCS σ processes such that P ⊑ may Q and let C be a context with a fresh labeling and in which + does not occur. Then
This also implies that ≈ may , ≈ must are congruences. Note that P, Q in the above proposition are not required to have linear labelings, P might include multiple occurrences of the same label thus limiting the power of the schedulers S P . This shows the locality of the scheduler's restriction: some choices inside P are hidden from the scheduler but the rest of the context is fully visible.
If we remove the freshness condition then Proposition 6 is no longer true. Let P = l 1 : a. can pass the test with probability 1 by selecting the correct branch of O based on the outcome of the probabilistic choice. In C[P ] this is not possible because of the labels l 1 , l 2 that are common in P, C.
We can now state the result that we announced in Section 1.
Theorem 1. Let P, Q be CCS σ processes and C a context with a fresh labeling and without occurrences of bang. Then
The proof is given in the appendix. There are two crucial points in the above Theorem. The first is that the labels of the context are copied, thus the scheduler cannot distinguish between C[l 1 : τ.P ] and C[l 1 : τ.Q] based on the labels of the context. The second is that P, Q are protected by a τ action labeled by the same label l 1 . This is to ensure that in the case of a nondeterministic sum (C = R + []) the scheduler cannot find out whether the second operand of the choice is P or Q unless it commits to selecting the second operand. For example let R = l 1 :(l 2 :a+ 0.5 0), P = l 3 :a, Q = 0. Then R 1 = (R + a) + 0.1 (R + 0) is not testing equivalent to R 2 = R + (a + 0.1 0) since they can be separated by O = a.ω and a scheduler that resolves R + a to a and R + 0 to R. However, if we take R
is testing equivalent to R 2 since the scheduler will have to resolve both branches of R ′ 1 in the same way (even though we still have non-determinism). The problem with replication is simply the persistence of the processes. It is clear that !P + p !Q cannot be equivalent in any way to !(P + p Q) since the first replicates only one of P, Q while the second replicates both. However Theorem 1 together with Proposition 6 imply that
where C is a context without bang and C ′ is a context without +. The same is also true for ≈ must . This means that we can lift the sum towards the root of the context until we reach a bang. Intuitively we cannot move the sum outside the bang since each replicated copy must perform a different probabilistic choice with a possibly different outcome.
Theorem 1 shows that the probabilistic choice is indeed private to the process and invisible to the scheduler. The process can perform it at any time, even in the very beginning of the execution, without making any difference to an outside observer.
An application to security
In this section we discuss an application of our framework to anonymity. In particular, we show how to specify the Dining Cryptographers protocol [21] so that it is robust to scheduler-based attacks. We first propose a method to encode secret value passing, which will turn out to be useful for the specification:
l:c v .P ∆ = l:cv.P
This is the usual encoding of value passing in CSS except that we use the same label in all the branches of the nondeterministic sum. To ensure that the resulting labeling will be deterministic we should restrict the channels cv i and make sure that there will be at most one output on c. We will write (νc)P for (νcv 1 ) . . . (νcv n )P . For example, the labeling of the following process is deterministic:
This case is a combination of the cases (2) and (4) of Proposition 5. The two outputs on c are on different branches of the probabilistic sum, so during an execution at most one of them will be available. Thus there is no ambiguity in scheduling the sum produced by c(x). The scheduler σ(l).σ(l 1 , l 2 ) will perform a synchronization on cv 1 or cv 2 , whatever is available after the probabilistic choice. In other words, using the labels we manage to hide the information about which value was transmitted to P .
Fig . 6 . Encoding of the dining cryptographers with probabilistic master
Dining cryptographers with probabilistic master
The problem of the Dining Cryptographers is the following: Three cryptographers are dining together. At the end of the dinner, the bill has to be paid by either one of them or by another agent called the master. The master decides who will pay and then informs each of them separately whether he has to pay or not. The cryptographers would like to find out whether the payer is the master or one of them. However, in the latter case, they also wish to keep the payer anonymous. The Dining Cryptographers Protocol (DCP) solves the above problem as follows: each cryptographer tosses a fair coin which is visible to himself and his neighbor to the right. Each cryptographer checks the two adjacent coins and, if he is not paying, announces agree if they are the same and disagree otherwise. However, the paying cryptographer will say the opposite. It can be proved that if the number of disagrees is even, then the master is paying; otherwise, one of the cryptographers is paying [21] .
An external observer O is supposed to see only the three announcements out i . . . . As discussed in [22] , DCP satisfies anonymity if we abstract from their order. If their order is observable, on the contrary, then a scheduler can reveal the identity of the payer to O simply by forcing the payer to make his announcement first. Of course, this is possible only if the scheduler is unrestricted and can choose its strategy depending on the decision of the master (or on the results of the coins).
In our framework we can solve the problem by giving a specification of the DCP in which the choices of the master and of the coins are made invisible to the scheduler. The specification is shown in Figure 6 . We use some meta-syntax for brevity: The symbols ⊕ and ⊖ represent the addition and subtraction modulo 3, while ⊗ represents the addition modulo 2 (xor). The notation i == n stands for 1 if i = n and 0 otherwise.
There are many sources of nondeterminism: the order of communication between the master and the cryptographers, the order of reception of the coins,
Adding an "independent" scheduler to the calculus and the order of the announcements. The crucial points of our specification, which make the nondeterministic choices independent from the probabilistic ones, are: (a) all communications internal to the protocol (master-cryptographers and cryptographers-coins) are done by secret value passing, and (b) in each probabilistic choice the different branches have the same labels. For example, all branches of the master contain an output on m 0 , always labeled by l 2 , but with different values each time. Thanks to the above independence, the specification satisfy strong probabilistic anonymity. There are various equivalent definitions of this property, we follow here the version presented in [22] . Let o represent an observable (the sequence of announcements), and p S (o |m i 1 ) represent the conditional probability, under the scheduler S, that the protocol produces o given that the master has selected Cryptographer i as the payer. Figure  6 satisfies the following property: for all schedulers S and all observables o,
Proposition 7 (Strong probabilistic anonymity). The protocol in
Note that different schedulers will produce different traces (we still have nondeterminism) but they will not depend on the choice of the master.
Some previous treatment of the DCP, including [22] , had solved the problem of the leak of information due to too-powerful schedulers by simply considering as observable sets of announcements instead than sequences. Thus one could think that using a true concurrent semantics, for instance event structures, would solve the problem. We would like to remark that this is false: true concurrency would weaken the scheduler enough in the case of the DCP, but not in general. For instance, it would not help in the anonymity example in the introduction.
Dining cryptographers with nondeterministic master
We sketch here a method to hide also certain nondeterministic choices from the scheduler, and we show an application to the variant of the Dining Cryptographers with nondeterministic master.
First we need to extend the calculus with the concept of a second independent scheduler T that we assume to solve the nondeterministic choices that we want to make transparent to the main scheduler S. The new syntax and semantics are shown in Figure 7 . l : {P } represents a process where the scheduling of P is protected from the main scheduler S. The scheduler S can "ask" T to schedule P by selecting the label l. Then T resolves the nondeterminism of P as expressed by the INDEP rule. Note that we need to adjust also the other rules of the semantics to take T into account, but this change is straightforward. We assume that T does not collaborate with S so we do not need to worry about the labels in P .
To model the dining cryptographers with nondeterministic master we replace the M aster process in Figure 6 by the following one.
M aster
Essentially we have replaced the probabilistic choice by a protected nondeterministic one. Note that the labels of the operands are different but this is not a problem since this choice will be scheduled by T . Note also that after the choice we still have the same labels l 2 , l 3 , l 4 , however the labeling is still deterministic, similarly to the case 3 of Proposition 5.
In case of a nondeterministic selection of the culprit, and a probabilistic anonymity protocol, the notion of strong probabilistic anonymity has not been established yet, although some possible definitions have been discussed in [22] . Our framework makes it possible to give a natural and precise definition.
Definition 3 (Strong probabilistic anonymity for nondeterministic selection of the culprit). A protocol with nondeterministic selection of the culprit satisfies strong probabilistic anonymity iff for all observables o, schedulers S, and independent schedulers T 1 , T 2 which select different culprits, we have:
We can prove the above property for our protocol:
Proposition 8. The DCP with nondeterministic selection of the culprit specified in this section satisfies strong probabilistic anonymity.
Conclusion and Future work
We have proposed a process-calculus approach to the problem of limiting the power of the scheduler so that it does not reveal the outcome of hidden random choices, and we have shown its applications to the specification of informationhiding protocols. We have also discussed a feature, namely the distributivity of certain contexts over random choices, that makes our calculus appealing for verification. Finally, we have considered the probabilistic testing preorders and shown that they are precongruences in our calculus.
Our plans for future work are in two directions: (a) we would like to investigate the possibility of giving a game-theoretic characterization of our notion of scheduler, and (b) we would like to incorporate our ideas in some existing probabilistic model checker, for instance PRISM. The proof will be by induction on the structure of C. Let O range over tests with fresh labelings, let S 1 range over nonblocking schedulers for both C[τ.P ] and C[τ.Q] (such that σ(l).S 1 is a nonblocking scheduler for R 1 ) and let S 2 range over nonblocking schedulers for R 2 . The induction hypothesis is:
We have the following cases for C:
has to be of the form
where l 2 is the label of a a prefix in O (if no such prefix exists then the case is trivial). A scheduler of the form σ(l 1 , l 2 ).S can schedule any process of the form l 1 :a.X (with label l 1 ) giving the transition:
and producing always the same O ′ . The probability p ω for these processes will be given by equation (10) . Thus for (⇒) we have 
= p ω (R 2 , S 2 , O)
For (⇐) we can perform the above derivation in the opposite direction, given that a scheduler for R 2 = l 1 : a.C ′ [P + p Q] must be of the form S 2 = σ(l 1 , l 2 ).S 
For (⇐) we can perform the above derivation in the opposite direction.
-Case C = l 1 :(C ′ + q R) Since we consider only contexts with fresh labelings, the labels of C ′ are disjoint from those of R, thus the scheduler of a process of the form l 1 : (C ′ 
Now consider the process C ′ [l 0 :τ.Q] + R. Since P and Q are behind the l 1 :τ action, this process has exactly the same visible labels as C ′ [l 0 : τ.P ] + R. Thus S R and S C will select R and C ′ [l 0 :τ.Q] respectively and the equations (13) and (14) For (⇐) we can perform the above derivation in the opposite direction. 
